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11. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Dismissal Was Ina~oro~riate  B cause the District Court 
Abused Its Discretion in Refusing to Accent Ms. Schoeer's Guile Plea. 
1. Introduction. 
Ms. Schoger's Amended Petition alleged that "she informed counsel that she wanted to 
go forward with a guilty plea, but the court refused to conduct any further inquiry of the factual 
basis, or to conduct any analysis of whether her plea was appropriate under Alford v. United 
States. [sic]"' CR 18. The State, in its Answer, alleged that "the record speaks for itself as to the 
Court's refusal to conduct any further inquiry as to the [actual basis or to conduct any analysis of 
whether her plea was appropriate under Alford v. United States [sic], 400 U.S. 25 (1970). CR 41. 
The District Court, in its Memorandum Opinion re: State's Motion to Disn~iss, did not directly 
address the claim or the waiver issue. However, as shown below, the District Court did abuse its 
discretion in refusing to accept Ms. Schoger's proffered Alford plea. 
2. Why the Court Abused its Discretion. 
A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) does not correctly perceive the issue as 
discretionary, or (2) does not act within the bounds of discretion or fails to apply the correct legal 
standards, or (3) fails to reach the decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,765, 86 P.3d 475, 482 (2004). Here, the 
Court abused its discretion because it rejected the Alford plea based upon Ms. Schoger's denial 
that she possessed at least 200 grams of methamphetamine. However there is no requirement 
' North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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that the defendant establish a factual basis in order for an Alford plea to be valid and the District 
Court should not have rejected her guilty plea simply because Ms. Schoger did not admit guilt to 
its satisfaction. Therefore, the District Court's rejection of Ms. Schoger's Alford plea was not 
based upon the correct legal standards nor was it based upon an exercise of reason. 
The Court stated its reasons for rejecting the Alford plea on the record. 
MR. BARNUM: Would the court consider taking this in the manner of an Alford 
plea at this point? I understand the struggle with the factual basis. 
THE COURT: The short answer is no, and I'll tell you why, Mr. Bamum. 
By this plea of guilty, she gives up her right to appeal the decision on the 
suppression motion. 
T. Vol. I, pg. 115, pg. 1-9. Of course, this is no reason to reject an otherwise knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary guilty plea. All non-conditional guilty pleas bar the defendant from challenging 
pre-trial rulings and the State may have offered the charge reduction because it did not want to 
face the possibility of losing the suppression issue on appeal. Further, the Court expressly asked 
Ms. Schoger whether she understood that her plea "is effectively a waiver of [her] right to appeal 
that decision." Ms. Schoger answered that she understood. T. Vol. I, pg. 107, In. 17-22. Thus, 
there is nothing about the loss of appellate rights in this plea or in Alford pleas in general which 
should have caused the District Court to reject it. 
The State argued below that the Court did not abuse its discretion because a Court must 
establish a factual basis before accepting a plea if the defendant refuses to admit his participation 
in the crime or continues to assert his innocence. However, this argument fails for three reasons. 
First, the Court was not required to obtain a factual basis. As the State frankly admits, 
there is no general requirement that the trial court must establish a factual basis for the crimes 
charged prior lo accepting a guilty plea. State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543,545,661 P.2d 328,330 
(1983); State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522, 524, 887 P.2d 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285,290, 787 P.2d 271, 276 (1990). A factual basis is only needed when 
the defendant refuses to admit she is guilty of the offense. That is simply not the case here. Ms. 
Schoger did not refuse to admit her participation in the crime, nor did she continue to assert her 
innocence. To the contrary, the District Court entered into an extended colloquy with Ms. 
Schoger, after which it found that the guilty plea met all the prerequisites for acceptance of a plea 
listed in ICR 1 l(c)(l)-(5). T. Vol. I, pg. 102, In. 1 - pg. 11 1 In. 9 
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Schoger based upon what you've told me, then, I find 
you understand the potential consequences of your decision to plead guilty. I find 
that your plead of guilty is a voluntary decision. And finally, that you committed 
the crime of trafficking in methamphetan~ine in a quantity greater than 200 grams. 
Do you agree with those finding? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
T. Vol. I, pg. 11 1, In. 10-19. In light of Ms. Schoger's answers to the Court's questions and the 
Court's findings, it did not need to obtain a factual basis for the offense, 
Second, the State's argument ignores the fact that the factual basis does not need to come 
kom the defendant. Quite to the contrary, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "As long as there 
is a strong factual basis for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him, a 
voluntary plea of guilty may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant 
that he is innocent." Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60,61,625 P.2d 414,415 (1981), citing Alfod, 
supra (emphasis added). "The reason for such an inquiry, however, is not to satisfy the court that 
the defendant is indeed guilty of the crime. Instead, such an inquiry should serve to indicate that 
the plea is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily being entered by the defendant, despite his or 
her continuing claim of innocence or inabil~ty to recall the facts of the incident." State v. 
Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 862-63, 876 P.2d 142, 144-145 (Ct. App. 1994). In Horkley the 
defendant could not provide a factual basrs for the vehicular manslaughter charge because he 
could not remember what had happened due to injuries suffered during the accident. The District 
Court in Horkey obtained the factual basis from the attorneys. Likewise, in Alford, the defendant 
strongly protested that he was not guilty but wanted to take the deal in order to avoid the death 
penalty. The state provided the factual basts in Alford. 400 U.S., pg. 32. In this case, however, 
the District Court never asked defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney to present a factual 
basis. To reject the Alford plea under these circumstances was an abuse of discretion. 
Third, the State's argument ignores the fact that the District Court did not reject the 
Alford plea for lack of a factual basis. The District Court actually rejected the plea based upon its 
own beliefs on when such a plea is appropriate 
What she has just told me is a defense, is a factual innocence assertion as to the 
charge. It's one thing to enter an Alford pleas under true Alford circumstances, 
which was, "I don't recall2, ". . . . But an Alford plea, in my view, is not an 
appropriate mechanism for a defendant to say, "I didn't commit the crime, but I 
As noted above, the District Court is mistaken about what constitutes a true Alford 
circumstance. The defendant in Alfbrd did not claim that he didn't recall the facts of the offense. 
He asserted that he was innocent. The Supreme Court noted that "[alfter giving his version of 
the events of the night of the murder, Alford stated: 'I pleaded guilty on second degree murder 
because they said there is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the 
other man. We never had an argument in our life and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I 
didn't they would gas me for it, and that is all."' 400 U.S., pg. 28 ft. 2. 
wish to avail myself of a plea offer in the case." 
The reason we have jury trials is to assess gailt or innocence, and this is precisely 
a case where I think that it would be an abuse of my responsibilities to afford the 
defendant of her constitutional right to have a guilt or innocence determination 
rather than extracting a plea of guilty under the threat of increased punishment. 
T. Val. 1, pg. 115,111. 20- pg. 116, in. 1 
This analysis is misguided. It is the defendant who gets to decide whether to plead guilty, 
not the Court. The Court can no more reject a guilty plea because it believes the defendant might 
be innocent than it can force a defendant to plead guilty when it believes the defendant is 
probably guilty. It is simply not the choice of the Court. If Ms. Schoger, who was admittedly 
guilty of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to delrver, wishes to plead to the 
slightly greater charge of Trafficking in 200 grams in order to avoid the risk of being convicted 
of the much more serious charge of Trafficking in 400 grams, that is her choice. The Court does 
not stand in locopaventis to an adult defendant who is represented by counsel. As stated by the 
Alford Court, the standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea is "whether the plea 
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 
defendant." 400 U.S., pg. 30. Therefore, the Court's decision, based upon its patronizing and 
paternalistic attitude toward Ms. Schoger and her ability to make rational choices among 
unpleasant alternatives, was not based upon an exercise of reason and was an abuse of its 
discretion. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the District Court's view of the proper use of an Alford plea, 
it is common and proper for defendants to accept settlement offers even when they believe they 
are innocent, but wish to avail themselves of the settlement offer. No one is so naive as to think 
that mere factual innocence is a guarantee of a not guilty verdict at trial. There is no doubt that 
innocent people are convicted by juries, as is demonstrated regularly by the DNA exoneration 
cases. As reported in the New York Times, "State lawmakers across the country are adopting 
broad changes to criminal justice procedures as a response to the exoneration of more than 200 
convicts through the use of DNA. . . . Studies of wrongful convictions suggest that there are 
thousands more innocent people in jails and prisons." Solomon Moore, Exonerations Using 
DNA Brings Change in Legal System, New York Tiines. October 1,2007. Of course, the DNA 
exonerations only cheer those defendants who are lucky enough to have DNA evidence in their 
cases. People who are convicted on unreliable eyewitness identification or are found guilty by 
their association with the truly guilty party are equally common. 
The reasons why Ms. Schoger might want to hedge her bets instead of going to trial are 
manifest. Ms. Schoger's defense at trial, i.e., "I only had 56 grams of methamphetamine and 
didn't know about the other 344 grams my boyfriend had hidden," was obviously problematic, 
even if true. First, it required her to concede that she was a drug dealer, just not as big of a drug 
dealer as suggested by the state. That, obviously, is not a defense with a lot of "jury appeal." 
Second, her protests of lack of knowledge or constructive possession would be viewed 
suspiciously by jurors who might believe she was only admitting to possessing the 56 grams 
because she was caught red-handed and was now trying to shift the blame to her boyfnend. The 
success of the defense also depends on convincing her boyfriend to testify that he hid the 
methamphetamine from Ms. Schoger and that she was not aware of its presence in the house. 
Ms. Schoger, however, might have also known at the time she proffered the Alford plea that her 
boyfriend was not going to testify on her behalf at trial (which, as it turned out, he did not.) 
Thus, there may have been practical proof problems with the defense case, in addition to the 
theoretical problems. 
3. Conclusion. 
The District Court's rejection of the Alfovd plea due to its own conception of what was in 
Ms. Schoger's best interest and its distaste of the use of Alford pleas in cases where there is a 
claim of factual innocence is not consistent with the legal choices available to the Court and was 
not made by an exercise of reason. This abuse of discretion is disturbing in this case because the 
District Court was well aware that if Ms. Schoger were to be convicted at trial, she would face a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. It is especially 
disturbing because the Court turned out to be flat-out wrong about Ms. Schoger having a viable 
defense to the charge and the District Court had to impose the more severe sentence. In essence, 
the Court took a double or nothing bet with Ms. Schoger's life and lost. To do so against her wilI 
and against the advice of her attorney was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the District Court 
erred in summarily dismissing this post-conviction claim. 
B. Summary Dismissal Was Iuav~ropriate Because There Were Issues of 
Disvuted Material Fact as to the Ineffective Assistance of Avoellate Counsel 
g&& 
1 .  Introduction 
In its motion for summary disposition, the State argued that Ms. Schoger's claim that the 
Court abused its discretion in failing to accept the guilty plea was waived because it could have 
been raised on appeal. Supp. CR (Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal, pg. 16. While, the 
District Court did not address this issue in its memorandum Opinion re: Motion to Dismiss, it is 
anticipated that the State will renew its waiver argument on appeal. In the event the Court finds 
that the guilty plea issue could have been raised on direct appeal and is therefore deemed to be 
forfeited in post-conviction proceedings, see I.C. 19-4901 (b), Ms. Schoger was deprived of the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Idaho Code § 19-852 gives a criminal defendant the right to be represented on any appeal. 
This right guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 
685,687,905 P.2d 86,88 (1995). Further, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to ensure that an indigent appellant receive effective assistance of counsel on his 
first appeal of right from a judgment of conviction. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). The Strickland standard 
generally applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Roe v. Flores- 
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,476-77 (2000). 
2. It Was Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel to Fail to Challenge the 
Trial Court's Improper Rejection of the Guilty Plea. 
To show deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation 
did not meet objective standards of co~npetence. Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88,92, 137 P.3d 475, 
479 (Ct. App. 2006); Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34,39, 121 P.3d 965,969 (Ct. App. 2005). A 
defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious advocate. 
Huckv. State, 124 Idaho 155, 157,857 P.2d 634,636 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 
4,8,539 P.2d 556,560 (1975). Therefore, appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. Jakoski v. 
State, 136 Idaho 280,285,32 P.3d 672,677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelIe v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 
119, 937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App. 1997). While, as a general matter, courts will not attempt to 
second-guess counsel's strategic and tactical choices, see State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551,21 
P.3d 483,488 (2001), this rule does not apply to counsel's decisions that are the result of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation. Id. A post-conviction applicant can overcome the presumption of effective 
assistance by showing that the ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented. See Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,288 (2000); Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,661, 168 P.3d 40,45 (Ct. 
App. 2007), rev. denied September 14,2007. 
Appellate counsel's performance in this case was deficient under Strickland because he 
failed to raise the issue that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to reject the 
proffered plea. The issue was preserved for appeal and there is no conceivable strategic reason for 
appellate counsel to fail to raise the issue. 
Moreover, Ms. Schoger was prejudiced because the issue was meritorious, as 
demonstrated above, while the sentencing issue which was actually raised on appeal was frivolous 
considering the ten-year fixed term was the lowest possible sentence which could be imposed 
after trial. To show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. 
Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88,92, 137 P.3d 475,479 (Ct. App. 2006); Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 
34,39, 121 P.3d 965,969 (Ct. App. 2005). In this case, as explained above, this Court would 
have vacated the conviction and remanded the case for entry of a guilty plea to the reduced charge 
because the District Court abused its discretion by rejecting the voluntary, knowing and 
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intelligently made plea to the reduced charge. And, the District Court would have imposed a 
lesser sentence upon remand. 
Thus, there is at least a material question of fact as to whether Ms. Schoger was prejudiced 
by appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal and the petition should not have been 
summarily dismissed. 
111. CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Ms. Schoger respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district 
court's order summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further 
proceedings. 
kcf\ 
Respectfully submitted t h i s 2  day of May, 2008. 
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